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Post-Judgment Garnishment Without Notice And
a Hearing Is Constitutional
In Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that Florida's post-judgment garnishment statutes' satisfy
due process requirements even though they fail to provide the judgment
debtor with notice and an opportunity for a hearing on his entitlement to
a statutory wage exemption3 before wages are attached.
Liberty Loan Corp. obtained a judgment against Etta Jane Brown in the
amount of $646.03. A court clerk issued a writ of garnishment against
Brown's employer twelve days later. Brown did not receive notice of the
garnishment proceedings until the writ was served on her employer. On the
same day that the writ was served, Brown filed an affidavit claiming the
statutory wage exemption. The next day Liberty denied Brown's exemption claim, and two weeks later, at the resulting hearing, the county court
found that Brown qualified for the exemption and dissolved the writ.
Brown instituted a class action in federal district court, claiming that
the Florida statutory procedure for post-judgment garnishment violated
her procedural due process rights. The District Court issued a declaratory
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded money damages to Brown.'
The State of Florida, which had intervened as a defendant, appealed the
judgment.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning pre-judgment garnishment
and property seizure in conjunction with procedural due process questions
provide the major source of analysis in this area.' Sniadach v. Family
1. 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. §77.01 and §77.03 (Supp. 1975-1976). Under the Florida procedure, a
judgment debtor need only file an unverified motion stating the amount of the judgment and
that he believes the judgment debtor does not have visible property sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. The court clerk will then issue a writ of garnishment.
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. §222.11 and §222.12 (1973). Money due a person for personal labor and
services, if he is the head of a family residing in Florida, is exempt from post-judgment
garnishment. The judgment debtor must file a sworn statement claiming the exemption with
the court clerk who issued the writ of garnishment. If the judgment creditor does not deny,
under oath, the debtor's affidavit within two days after he receives notice, the writ of garnishment is automatically dissolved. If the creditor denies the exemption, a hearing must be held.
The attached wages will continue to be held until a court order dissolves the writ.
4. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd, 539 F.2d 1355
(5th Cir. 1976). See Note, Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 3 FLA. ST. U. L. Rxv., 626, 637-642
(1975), for an analysis of the trial court's decision.
5. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment of a
bank account); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration of property
in which the creditor had a security interest); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin
of property); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment).
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Finance Corp.' was the only one of these cases dealing specifically with
garnishment of wages. In that case the creditor had filed a complaint
alleging default on a promissory note and caused a writ of garnishment to
issue, thereby freezing 50% of the debtor's wages. The Supreme Court,
balancing the competing interests of the debtor and the creditor, emphasized the special nature of wages and the hardships that wage-earners with
families experience when a portion of their wages are frozen until trial.,
The Court concluded that prior notice and hearing are required by the Due
Process Clause in pre-judgment wage garnishment cases even though the
8
deprivation may be temporary.
Since Sniadach, the Supreme Court has continued to grapple with the
question of what procedures are constitutionally sufficient in pre-judgment
garnishment and attachment cases. In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., and
North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, 0 the Court moved away from
Sniadach'sseemingly absolute requirements of notice and a hearing before
any deprivation of property. Although notice and a hearing are required
before a deprivation of property becomes final, their nature and timing
may be varied in light of competing governmental and private interests as
long as minimum protections against wrongful deprivations of property are
present." If the creditor's interests in obtaining a writ of garnishment or
attachment of property are strong enough when weighed against the
debtor's interests in continued enjoyment of his property and the statutory
procedures adequately protect against wrongful deprivations of property,
-notice and hearing prior to seizure of property are not required.' 2
Post-judgment-garnishment or property-execution cases cannot, however, be analyzed solely in terms of the pre-judgment cases. The U.S.
Supreme Court discussed the procedural due process aspects of postjudgment wage garnishment more than fifty years ago in Endicott-Johnson
Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.' In that case the garnishee contended
that New York's statutory procedures violated due process because they
authorized issuance of a writ of garnishment to execute a judgment with6. 395 U.S. 337 (1975).
7. Id. at 340-341. At present a maximum of 25% of an employee's wages can be garnished
under the Consumer Protection Act of 1968, Subchapter II, 15 U.S.C.A. §§1671-1677 (1974).
8. 395 U.S. at 342.
9. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
10. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
11. 419 U.S. 601, 610 (Powell, J., concurring); 416 U.S. 600, 624 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell's concurrence was the decisive fifth
vote in the Mitchell majority. See Dunham, Post-Judgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing? 21 S.DAK. L.
REv. 78, 92 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dunham], where the author analyzes the opinions
of the members of the Court (before Justice Douglas' retirement) and concludes that Justices
Powell and White hold the key votes. He believes that they will uphold only those state
procedures which adequately protect against wrongful deprivations.
12. 416 U.S. at 618.
13. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
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out providing prior notice and a hearing for the judgment debtor. The
Court, upholding the statute, reasoned that the judgment debtor had already been given his day in court during the trial on the merits and that
the judgment notified him in advance that execution procedures might
follow. Therefore, no further notice or hearing prior to the issuance of a writ
of garnishment was necessary to satisfy due process." Until recently, courts
have been applying this rationale to due-process challenges of judgmentexecution procedures almost without question. 15
The due process requirement of notice in judgment-execution cases was
discussed again in Griffin v. Griffin, a case allowing only limited enforcement of an alimony decree. There had been three trial-court decisions.
After a trial in 1926, the court issued a decree ordering alimony payments.
In 1936, the same court, after a fully contested hearing, issued an order
which set the amount of arrearages then due. In 1938, without notice to
the husband, the wife obtained another court order which reduced the
amount of arrearages due through the year 1938, including the 1936 order,
to a judgment which could then be executed. The Supreme Court said the
entry of the 1938 judgment violated the husband's due process rights insofar as it adjudged arrearages between 1936 and 1938.11 While not mentioning Endicott, the Court rejected the argument that the entry of the 1926
decree gave the husband adequate notice that enforcement steps would be
taken in the future if necessary. "[Djue process does . . . require further
notice of the time and place of such further proceedings inasmuch as they
undertook substantially to affect his rights in ways in which the 1926
decree did not."'" However, the 1938 judgment, insofar as it relied upon
the 1936 order, was adjudged constitutionally correct since that order was
the result of a full adversary hearing. Any defenses which the husband had
against arrearages found due in the 1936 order were heard and finally
decided in that hearing. Since no further defenses to those arrearages
existed, the Court stated that a proceeding to reduce to judgment the 1936
arrearages would be constitutional despite lack of prior notice to the husband."
The full impact of the Griffin decision cannot be understood without
referring to Justice Douglas' dissent from the dismissal of a writ of certior0
ari in Hanner v.DeMarcus.1
He stated that Endicott's rationale (regarding the judgment itself as adequate notice) no longer fulfilled modern
14. Id. at 288.
15. See, e.g., Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395
U.S. 825 (1969); Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); See also
Dunham, supra note 11, at 80 n.13 for a collection of cases applying Endicott.
16. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
17. Id. at 232.
18. Id. at 229.
19. Id. at 233-234.
20. 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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expectations of due-process notice requirements." Justice Douglas argued
that the Endicott decision had been rejected by the Court in Griffin. He
interpreted the Griffin decision as requiring notice whenever an execution
proceeding substantially affected rights not affected by the previous judgment. Under this rationale, prior notice and a hearing would be required
whenever a judgment debtor had statutory defenses, such as the exemption
from garishment in Brown or the right to choose the property to be levied
2
upon in Hanner.
The Fifth Circuit in Brown rejected the judgment debtor's argument
that the Griffin decision entirely undercuts Endicott's precedential value.
Conceding that the two decisions.were arguably in conflict,u the court
noted that the Court in Griffin carefully distinguished "enforcement of a
judgment obtained with notice and an opportunity for a hearing" from
"enforcement of a judgment rendered without those elements. 2 The
Griffin decision held unconstitutional only the part of the 1938 judgment
5
based on arrearages accrued after the last fully contested hearing.
After accepting Endicott's status as valid authority, the court refused to
rely on it as controlling the result in Brown. The pre-judgment garnishment and property seizure cases established the need to balance various
interests in order to determine what procedures due process required.
In balancing those interests, the Fifth Circuit characterized the judgment creditor's interest in Brown as much weightier than the interest of
the pre-judgment creditor in Sniadach.Y However, the judgment debtor's
interests were identified as being essentially the same as those of the
Sniadach debtor. Each debtor was interested primarily in retaining the use
of wages during a time in which the creditor's right to retain those funds
was not finally established. 8 The court found that the existence of a judgment outweighed the judgment debtor's interests, especially in view of the
2
protections afforded the debtor by federal statutes.
The court's rationale in upholding Florida's procedures rested heavily on
two elements. First, Florida's procedures were perceived as "expeditious."
The lack of an express statutory requirement that the hearing be held
21. Id. at 741.
22. Id. at 742.
23. The Court cited Dunham, supra note 11.
24. 539 F.2d at 1364.
25. 327 U.S. at 234-235.
26. 539 F.2d at 1364-1365.
27. Id. at 1366.
28. Id. at 1367.
29. Id. at 1368-1369. The federal legislation is the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968
(see note 7, supra)which limits the percentage of wages susceptible to garnishment to twentyfive percent and also limits an employer's right to fire an employee whose wages are garnished. These protections were not in effect when the writ of garnishment was issued in
Sniadach.
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without delay 0 did not change the court's conclusion. Instead, the court
relied on apparent state court practices in which the exemption hearing
was not unreasonably delayed.' As a further indication of the procedure's
expeditious nature, the court focused on the statutory requirement automatically dissolving the writ of garnishment two days after the judgment
creditor receives notice of the debtor's 32exemption claim unless the creditor
denies the debtor's claim under oath.
Second, the court apparently relied on the Endicott rationale regarding
the constitutional requirement of proper notice. Though Endicott was not
cited, the court said: "Although the kind of notice provided in the proceedings leading to the underlying judgment is not itself notice of the later
garnishment activity, it serves at least to alert the debtor that future legal
action may be taken to satisfy the judgment."3 This Endicott-type reasoning supports the court's conclusion that lack of prior notice of the garnishment proceeding is relatively unimportant in post-judgment cases. The
court found that this Endicott-type notice plus the above-mentioned
"expeditious" exemption procedure sufficiently minimized any economic
34
injury to the judgment debtor.

The Fifth Circuit's treatment of the Endicottdecision presents an interesting compromise between lower courts which have rejected its rationale3
and those that have rigidly applied it." In each of these cases, the court
believed the facts presented a sharp choice between Endicott's procedural
due process rationale and the more recent pre-judgment cases' rationale.
In Brown, the court refused to choose the Mitchell - Di-Chem balancing
analysis to the exclusion of the Endicott rationale. The result is a balancing process which incorporated an Endicott-type reasoning into the court's
justification of Florida's statutory procedures." Such a treatment would
seem to be a reasonable approach for a lower court to take in light of the
Supreme Court's relatively recent refusal to reconsider Endicott-in Moya
v. DeBaca' and Hanner3 9
30. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §222.12 (1973). Compare the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
the statutory requirement for immediate hearing in Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 418, 420.
31. In Brown the hearing was held within two weeks.
32. 539 F.2d at 1368.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482, 489 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1976);
Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. at 1036-1037 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
36. See, e.g., Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Katz v. Ke Nam Kim,
379 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1974); Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn.
1973); But see Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972). While recognizing the
general validity of Endicott, the court in Scott refused to follow it in a confessed judgment
case where the judgment debtor had no notice of the judgment.
37. 539 F.2d at 1368.
38. 286 F. Supp. 606 (D. N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969).
39. 539 F.2d at 1368.
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However, it is arguable that the court failed to require sufficient procedures for preventing wrongful issuance of writs of garnishment. In
Mitchell, Di-Chem and Sniadach, the Supreme Court stressed the need for
prevention of wrongful or mistaken deprivation of property. Unlike the
Mitchell, Di-Chem and Sniadach majorities, the court in Brown relied
solely on procedures which it felt minimized economic or personal injury
to the judgment debtor after the writ was issued by allowing him to obtain
either dissolution of the writ or a hearing within a reasonable time by filing
a sworn affidavit claiming the statutory exemption.'" Only the provision
for automatic dissolution of a writ, unless the judgment creditor responds
with a sworn denial of the debtor's exemption claim within two days of
receiving notice, serves as any sort of substitute for preventive measures
prior to issuance of a writ. The fact that wages and similar income, because
of their necessity to poor families, have often been treated differently than
other types of property serves to emphasize the need for at least some prior
deterrence against wrongful or mistaken post-judgment garnishment.4'
This need, when combined with the Mitchell, Di-Chem and Sniadach
prevention rationales, places the Brown decision in a slightly less favorable
light.
ROBERT

L. PORTER, JR.

40. See note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
41. See 395 U.S. 337 (1968) (wages); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare
benefits); 416 U.S. at 614 (wages). For evidence that the necessity rationale is not dead,
consider Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). An important factor in the Court's decision not to require pretermination hearings in Social Security disability benefits cases was
the Court's perception of those benefits as not necessary in the same sense as wages or welfare
benefits, which are usually the sole source of family income.

